Systems thinking is presented as the antithesis of "'reductionism." This article--the first in a trilogy which intends to present an outoepistemological foundation for interpretive systemology--is concerned with understanding the ontoepistemological roots of reductionism. The immediate purpose of such an understanding is to provide an interpretive contrasting context (a counter-ontoepistemology) against which an ontoepistemology for systems thinking can dialectically be drawn (the second and third papers in the trilogy published in this issue of Systems Practice). The inquiry into the ontoepistemological roots of reductionism leads to the principle of noncontradiction. Such a principle is shown to be the source of the merging together the most fundamental ontological and epistemological principles ruling Western thought. As such, the), are shown to have brought about reductionism in modern science. Finally, the "form of essential recursiveness'" is put forward as a logical antithetical form with regard to the principle of noncontradiction and which will serve as a logical instrument for developing an ontoepistemology for the systems approach.
INTRODUCTION
The introductory paper to this special issue of Systems Practice (Fuenmayor and L6pez-Garay, 1991) presented an overview of the theoretical problems and questions which defined the program of Interpretive Systemology. The main theoretical problem was that of designing an ontology and an epistemology for an "interpretive systems approach."
The Meaning of a Systems Approach
It seems natural to start such task with the question, "What is meant by a systems approach?" or, more precisely, What is that which distinguishes a systems approach from other approaches? Answer: A "systems approach" Department of Interpretive Systemology, Universidad de Los Andes, Mrrida, Venezuela. Fuenmayor means to "approach" or "see" things (or phenomena) as systems--a simple answer indeed. Now, when in the literature on systems the phrase "systems approach" is found, it is quite obvious that it does not refer to an everyday approach to phenomena in all life activities. It is rather concerned with the narrower context of science and design (of human activity systems, of technological software and hardware, etc.). Thus, it could be said that a systems approach is concerned with studying and designing (not just "perceiving") phenomena as if they were "systems. " However, what is meant by a "system"? A system is "a group of interrelated, interdependent, or interacting elements forming a collective unity" (Collins English Dictionary, 1979 , p. 1475 , or, in fewer words, a system is "a complex whole" (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1976 , p. 1174 ). Before such a definition, what is so special about seeing things as if they were systems? Is there anything that is not a system? Two possible types of nonsystems can be inferred from the previous definition:
(1) Indivisible entities (e.g., subatomic particles) which are not constituted by a plurality of elements and (2) Sets of elements which do not form a "collective unity."
The first type really cannot be considered phenomena (what is presented to us). Rather, they are atomic concepts without a direct phenomenal correlate (a subatomic particle or an atomic sensation cannot be experienced as this table, a symphony, or a university can be experienced). Thus, this first type of nonsystems can be discarded because a systems approach is concerned with studying phenomena as if they were systems.
The second type of nonsystems refers to collections that do not constitute a unity, i.e., sets defined by "extension" (not by "comprehension"). For example, the set constituted by a pencil, a cow, and my feeling of joy does not constitute a unity. To put it more precisely, this set of elements does not constitute a unity that transcends the mere meeting of their parts. On the contrary, a table, a computer, a living creature, or a hospital presents a unity which transcends the mere collection of its parts. To "transcend" means here to go beyond the mere collection of elements. This "going beyond" implies that a "collective unity" or "whole" has something in it that is present neither in the separated elements nor in their mere being together. It has thus a holistic sense. This apparently is equivalent to saying that there is a sort of "emergent property" arising from the interrelation of the elements. 2 So it can be said that a set 21t is argued elsewhere in this issue of Systems Practice (Fuenmayor, 1991a, b) that the very idea of "emergent property" arises from an ontological dualist and "Eleatic" prejudice which traps the systems approach in a "lobster pot." [For the meaning of "lobster pot," see Fuenmayor and Lrpez-Garay (1991).] 
